Monthly Archives: April 2012

An Interview with Ivan Goldman

What inspired you to write Isaac: a modern fable?

The story of Isaac and Abraham is a compelling story that I must have dwelled upon a thousand times, and I doubt I’m alone in this. Of course there’s a multitude of interpretations. It’s a big topic. I didn’t tackle it until I developed sufficient naiveté to think I could do it justice. This took many years.

I once heard a rabbi say the story means God was teaching us not to sacrifice human beings. Clearly this is bullshit. There were a lot easier ways to teach this lesson, and if that was the message, it could have been much clearer, as are the Ten Commandments. Thou shalt not covet they neighbor’s wife. No wriggle room there.

Finally it occurred to me that if a superior power could send an angel and a ram up there to give the story a happy ending then that power could also have granted Isaac eternal youth. Then I knew I had a story. But I quickly realized Isaac would have to be mortal. Otherwise it’s a Superman story. Bullets, swords, falls from high places, etc. can kill my Isaac, and he knows it. But he won’t grow old or be afflicted by disease. Also, Isaac, though he stepped out of a bible story, has no more knowledge about where we came from, where we’re going, or what is our purpose here than anyone else. He’s just as baffled.

Did you base Lenny’s immortality on any existing Jewish folklore?

I’m a very poor source of existing Jewish folklore, but as far as I know, his immortality is based on nothing like that.

Have you had any experience in the “academic underclass” like Ruth?

I’ve had experience both as a privileged tenured brat and as a member of the stepped-upon “adjunct” lecturer proletariat. I gave up tenure to go off and work as an editorial writer in Seattle for a while. There are, of course, excellent, hard-working professors. Unfortunately, I ran into too many tenured creeps who were so immune from the consequences of their actions that they were basically spoiled children with facial hair. I once sat on a committee that had to adjudicate a grievance filed by a professor who was furious that his department chair tried to schedule him for more than two days a week. Honest. For this, he earned full-time salary.

I wanted to give Ruth, the novel’s co-protagonist, the opportunity to rise from lecturer hell, off the tenure track, to the top. Consequently, she gets a job at a think tank. Most of the professors I worked with would consider a think tank the very top because there are no students there.

Boxing is a motif in your work.  What attracts you to the sport?

It’s a difficult sport that demands courage, grace, strength, agility, quickness, and conditioning. Other athletes tend to admire boxers. Fighters tend to be angry people who overcome their anger through the intense training and fights inside the ropes. That makes them strong, gentle people, for the most part — the epitome of gentlemen and gentlewomen. They’re likable. Also, I was bad at ball sports because I have no depth perception.

Can you tell us about any new upcoming projects?

I’m working on another novel. But I once tried to sell a joke to the Tonight Show, got a gentle rebuff, and later saw Carson do the joke. Consequently, I am a paranoid lunatic and don’t discuss my ideas until the work is sold.

Who are your favorite authors?

Dostoyevsky, Chekhov, and Heller come to mind. I also loved Updike’s “Rabbit” series and some of Philip Roth, mostly stuff he did later. He got better with age. I find that encouraging.

How does a writer survive in this economy?

The economics of it won’t work for most of us. You can’t even sell your soul to TV that easily now that they’ve replaced sitcoms and soaps with scripted ‘reality’ and gruesome ‘contest’ entertainment that pays writers miserably. Life is an unfair lottery. I try not to let it bother me. I wouldn’t trade my life with an investment banker whose mission is to own a more ridiculously expensive watch than the other investment bankers. I was in basic training with guys who were sent to Vietnam while I got orders for California. Some of those who shipped out never got a chance to come home and be shit upon. I was privileged to be shit upon with the rest of us.

CCLaP Fridays: Make It Stay, by Joan Frank

Today’s book review at CCLaP: “Make It Stay” by Joan Frank, which  I calls my favorite read so far of the year. The novel explores the lives of two couples in a small Northern California town as they encounter births, deaths, joys, and frustrations. I assert, “Frank’s highly polished literary prose is definitely worth your time.”

MONDAYS WITH THE SUPREMES, PART III: KOREMATSU, BROWN, AND PADILLA

A limited-run series where I review three books about the Supreme Court of the United States, exploring its historical and ideological conflicts, and the transformations it wrought upon law and society.

This is the story of three Supreme Court cases.  The three cases illustrate the real political power exercised by the Supreme Court and the concept of stare decisis, more commonly known as “binding precedent.”  Furthermore, the reader should see this section as a kind of intellectual exercise.  Legal legitimacy coupled with cultural acceptance creates a powerful cocktail that can make overturning legislation much more challenging.

The Court established itself as an independent branch of the United States government in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137(1803).  This allowed the Court to operate as “final arbiter” in constitutional disputes.  It announced to the Executive Branch that it wouldn’t act as the President’s handmaid.  The Supreme Court is not a rubber stamp to the President’s ever-growing imperial power.  (Congress has that job, at least in terms of its War Powers.  Since Vietnam, Congress, in acts worthy of the Heaven’s Gate cult, seems perfectly comfortable with acts of self-castration.  Besides, Congress engages in more pressing acts: seducing lobbyists, having affairs with staffers, and scanning wealthy families for trophy wife material.)

Coupled with its task as final arbiter, the Supreme Court utilizes the concept of “binding precedent.”  In an ideal circumstance, the Supreme Court does not legislate from the bench.  The Court either upholds or overturns the case based on precedent.  A Justice can’t just say, “This is wrong, don’t do it.”  A specific piece of legislation has to be deemed unconstitutional.  Previous Court cases, other laws, and the Constitution itself must support the constitutionality of the decisions.

While Congress writes laws to be signed into law by the President, the Supreme Court interprets the law.  But interpretation is a hollow exercise if it is not enforced.  These three cases show how the dance between constitutional interpretation and legal enforcement become a balancing act between branches.  Occasionally, these balancing acts spill over into public conflicts and duels.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)

Holding: The exclusion order leading to Japanese American Internment was constitutional.

Majority: Black, joined by Stone, Reed, Douglas, Rutledge, Frankfurter
Concurrence: Frankfurter
Dissent: Roberts
Dissent: Murphy
Dissent: Jackson

Korematsu is a lingering black eye on the American legal system.  It remains a damning indictment against the Executive excesses of FDR and the judicial spinelessness of his appointees.  Alternately, Korematsu shows a patriotic Supreme Court upholding the will of the Executive in times of war against a ruthless enemy dedicated to brutality, terror, and warmongering.  What do you think, Dear Reader?

The case, like the segregated armed forces and the alliance with Stalin, opens any number of vulnerabilities within the otherwise hagiographic treatment of the Greatest Generation.  No amount of nostalgia or selective memory will disprove that our leaders and our citizens had feet of clay.  The Second World War was not as black-and-white as the opposing forces in the Lord of the Rings.  Reality, to quote Herman Melville, had more ragged edges.

The case itself upheld Executive Order 9066 that legalized the internment of Japanese-Americans.  War hysteria following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor coalesced with decades of anti-Asian sentiment among Americans of European descent.  While Japan had spies and other intelligence agents working towards infiltration of the US mainland, Executive Order 9066 involved tackling a surgical problem with a sledgehammer.  Instead of targeting suspicious foreign agents working for enemy powers, it gave law enforcement the ability to arrest and imprison native-born US citizens.  It invalidated constitutional protections offered to any citizen born in the United States to those who looked like the enemy.  (Arizona’s recent anti-immigration law also reflects this racially motivated hysteria.  Illegal immigration is a problem, especially in Border States, but turning every “Mexican-looking” person into a potential felon is a stupid solution.)

A closer analysis of the decision reveals the potential time bomb that would later explode in Brown v. Board.  As Feldman writes in Scorpions,

With the war on, Black was disinclined to stand up for equality, even though his liberal, Catholic colleague Frank Murphy condemned the decision as pure racism.

Because the Korematsu case focused on a military order, Justice Jackson became torn and issued an enigmatic dissent, trying to balance “uphold[ing] a military order would distort constitutional law; striking it down would inappropriately second-guess military authority.”  As opposed to Robert Jackson’s concept of judicial pragmatism, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a concurrence stating that the internment program “is not be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless.”  Frankfurter believed in judicial restraint and opposed all measures to legislate from the bench.  Frankfurter’s assessment opened up the possibility for repealing segregation with the reasoning that the internment was necessary because it was wartime.  In peacetime, similar unfair treatment based on race was unconstitutional.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Holding: Segregation of students in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because separate facilities are inherently unequal. District Court of Kansas reversed.

Majority: Warren, joined by unanimous

During the Fifties and Sixties, the Warren Court oversaw the greatest expansion of civil rights and individual liberties in recent memory.  In Brown v Board of Education, Earl Warren wrote a unanimous opinion striking down segregation in schools.  It was an act whose time had come.  The Court followed in the footsteps of President Truman’s executive order desegregating the armed forces.  Truman’s actions were relatively easier than what the Court faced.  Unilateral action could be taken, since Truman acted as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.  Desegregating schools was a trickier business.

The long winding road of Brown v. Board culminated in the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision.  The unanimity of the Court gave the decision extra moral and legal heft necessary for such a radical social change.  Scorpions relates how the Court reached a unanimous vote; routinely holding over the decision until the next year and then having it reargued.  Only until Chief Justice Vinson, a proud Southerner and pro-segregationist, retired and with Justice Robert Jackson on his deathbed, were the circumstances right.

With stare decisis, the Court used Korematsu as a precedent to strike down Plessy v Ferguson.  In oral arguments, evidence was presented that showed that “separate but equal” did not mean what it said.  The races were separated but far from equal.  Everything from racist stereotypes in pop culture to redlining to legal disenfranchisement were engineered to keep African-Americans from getting any ideas about racial equality.  Plessy v Ferguson would not stand, since it was based on false pretenses.  Korematsu came into effect because of the reasoning involved.  The Japanese-American internment camps were created as a temporary measure.

Once the War ended, the camps would lack any basis for existence.  Since the US Government knowingly created the camps as a racist containment strategy, the same could be said for legal segregation.  Segregation contained “uppity blacks.”  With the US triumph in the Second World War against racist tyranny, it seemed a tad hypocritical to defend racist social engineering.  In addition, segregation was used as a canard to discredit American democracy.  Justice Robert Jackson understood this, because he had jousted with Hermann Goering during the Nuremberg Trials.  In the Fifties, the Soviets and American Communists consistently used segregation as an example of American capitalist evil.  The United States also had the awkward experience of explaining to African diplomats and dignitaries why hotel clerks and restauranteurs were treating them like shit.  Despite popular opinion to the contrary, especially but not exclusively, in the South, that the time had indeed come to rectify this perversion of democracy.

But it wasn’t all smooth sailing and waiting for segregationists to retire or die.  The nine justices battled between striking down school segregation with a unanimous vote and the order to do it immediately.  Like a refrain from a terrible pop song, the Court settled on a compromise.  (Compromises being the go-to solution for America’s self-inflicted race-based problems.)  In exchange for a unanimous vote and to appease stubborn Southerners on the Court, the Court decided to strike down Brown, but for the lower courts to establish their own timetables.  “Gradualism” was the key word.  Unfortunately, gradualism only sounded good on paper.  This opened the door for states to drag their feet or come up with creative legal loopholes.  This led to Southern governors challenging the Supreme Court’s authority, since the Court lacked any enforcement apparatus.  Eventually we get the National Guard escorting little black girls to school and repugnant alternate uses for fire hoses.

The Brethren picks up where Scorpions leaves off.  With desegregation legal and mandatory, it opened up a can of worms for courts to unravel.  If schools were desegregated, does that mean neighborhoods also need to be desegregated?  Do schools have to match the racial ratios of the neighborhoods they serve?  What about bussing?  The challenges associated with desegregation stretch into the Sixties, Seventies, and Eighties.  Even in the Nine, the Rehnquist Court, made up of a conservative and moderate majority, sought to strike down Brown, but with little success.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)

Holding: Habeas corpus petition had been improperly filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and should have been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina; petition should have named Padilla’s immediate custodian, not the Secretary of Defense.

Majority: Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Concurrence: Kennedy, joined by O’Connor
Dissent: Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

Padilla v. Rumsfeld appears like a culmination of Korematsu and Brown, but is in reality rather disappointing and dangerously inconclusive.  We have the similar themes of rights violation occurring during wartime (Congress keeping its rubber-stamping ability to legislation expanding Executive power in fighting trim.)  In this case, the concept of habeas corpus lay in the crosshairs.

Padilla, an American citizen, was held in the brig and charged as an “enemy combatant.”  The case could have unraveled the Bush Administration’s legal basis for torture, extraordinary rendition, and other authoritarian atrocities committed in the name of liberty and freedom.  (These colors don’t run, just the intelligence and common sense of the American voter.)  In the end, the case was struck down on a technicality, since Padilla should have petitioned the brig’s commandant, not the Secretary of Defense.  Unfortunately, this leaves a lot of questions unanswered and civil liberties extremely vulnerable to Executive malfeasance and whatever psychotic lunacy one can get away with by saying the magic words “national security.”

While Padilla is an unfortunate case, stare decisis and a future Court will have the opportunity to slay the dragon of Executive power run amok.  Since the War on Terror is technically finished, we’ll see how the laws and executive orders issued during those tumultuous years will hold up under judicial scrutiny.

Up next: Tapes and Tapes

The Art of Reviewing: Roland Barthes

The Art of Reviewing explores reviewing as an art form and as a valuable element to understanding society and profiles specific reviewers of merit.

“Criticism does not always demonstrate its customary incisiveness: it often ignores the most worthless ephemera.” – Karl Kraus

“I would go to the stake for a sensation and be a skeptic to the last.” – Oscar Wilde

Roland Barthes (1915 – 1980) was a theorist, literary critic, and semiotician, but most importantly, he expanded the field of reviewing.  In addition, he reinvented the ways in which things could be reviewed.  He looked at old works in new ways.  This installment of the Art of Reviewing will explore how Barthes reinvented and reinvigorated the concept of reviewing.  (This article is not meant to function as purely biographical or theoretical, but more as a means to show nascent reviewers the potential of Barthes’s ideas and continually evolving philosophy.)

One of the great things about Barthes was his ability to deconstruct his own philosophical perspective.  He began his career from the vantage point of orthodox Marxism, amplified with some semiotic theory taken from linguistics.  In the end, his philosophy became more personal, intimate, and autobiographical.  One of his last works was Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes.  He was too inventive and too passionate to remain affixed to any particular philosophical or ideological box.  As reviewers get older, their ideas change.  The slow evolution from the ideological Marxist to contemplative individual makes for a useful case study in the importance of changing one’s mind.

Barthes represents an important bridge between the complicated Marxist mysticism of pop culture critic Walter Benjamin and Michel Foucault’s large-scale deconstructionist archaeologies of institutions.  Barthes’s writings are a Rosetta Stone of pop culture studies and how cultures manufacture ideology with its ephemera.

Mythologies (1957)

Written in 1957, Mythologies has tautly written dissections of French pop cultural artifacts and is an indispensible educational tool for aspiring pop culture observers.  The first half has a collection of newspaper articles, most no longer than two pages, examining a specific item.  The selection is incredibly diverse and disregards arbitrary barriers like High and Low Culture.  It examines everything from TV wrestling matches (of the WCW variety), cuisine, science fiction, and museum exhibits.  A veritable Whitman’s Sampler of cultural detritus, a monument to the mundane and commonplace.  The second half of the book is an expanded explanation of semiotics (connotation, denotation, signifier, signified, etc.), along with its linguistic roots, and the accusation that the bourgeoisie is a “joint-stock company.”

Barthes takes the position of an orthodox Marxist to dissect and examine the cultural products of the postwar French bourgeoisie.  His status as an ideological outsider gives him a much-needed critical perspective.  The semiotic background gives him the intellectual apparatus to read the artifact.  More specifically, to read against the grain of the status quo.  In academic parlance, the “queer the text,” since Barthes was gay, like Foucault (and those contemporary Fifties bulwarks of American conservatism, Whittaker Chambers and Roy Cohn).

The book is a must read for cultural critics and curators of museums and historical societies.  Less for the Marxist readings per se, but for the book’s illustration of how to read material culture.  Material culture is a means of passing along our culture’s mores, codes, and traditions.  While these things are important, anyone tasked with writing exhibit labels should understand how these things are socially constructs manufactured by humans.  As such, each embodies a specific ideology and point of view.  Whether that is good or bad depends on the individual’s interpretation.  But one needs to understand that this manufactured ideology is present within the object.  In the book, Barthes gives the example of the black child soldier in a French military uniform saluting on the cover of the weekly magazine Paris Match.  On the surface, it is a poster that glorifies the patrie and the republican “us.”  Dig a little deeper and one realizes that the poster operates as a legitimizing force for colonialism and imperialism.  Mythologies was published shortly after France’s disastrous Indochina War (1946 – 1954) and amidst the brutalities of the Algerian Revolution (1954 – 1962).  This explains the vituperative passion Barthes had as a Marxist and utilizing the tools of linguistics as an intellectual means of exposing the oppressive agendas buried beneath seemingly innocent pop cultural artifacts.

On a more mundane level, the miniature shopping carts kids push around the grocery conditions them to become consumers.  Whether this is a horrifying example of mental abuse against a developing child or business as usual depends on the individual’s specific interpretation.  But to say that this social conditioning is not taking place seems like a particularly weak example of willful ignorance.  The recent rebooting of the GI Joe franchise and America’s Middle Eastern foreign policy seem like something far more ominous than tiny shopping carts.  “Go Joe!”

Sade Fourier Loyola (1976)

Sade Fourier Loyola explores the works of three major innovators of language: the French philosopher, pornographer and atheist Donatien Alphonse François, Marquis de Sade (2 June 1740 – 2 December 1814); the French utopian socialist François Marie Charles Fourier (7 April 1772 – 10 October 1837); and Basque Spanish theologian and founder of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) Ignacio López de Loyola (Saint Ignatius of Loyola) (1491 – July 31, 1556).  Barthes goes on to illustrate how each writer in this superficially blasphemous trio transformed language.  How the three writers reflect off each other displays Barthes’s unique take on the subject, transcending the standard academic category of “comparative literature.”

Everybody has heard of DAF Sade, yet very few have read his works.  In the opening sections of Sade Fourier Loyola, Barthes reflects on the contradictory accusations leveled against Sade: His works are boring and his works are shocking.  How can one be both?  Mythologies dissected pop cultural artifacts while Sade Fourier Loyola examined well-known works in a different way.  The comparative literary criticism Barthes achieves is reminiscent of the ad slogan, “Think different.”

He examines Sade’s work, seeing it in mathematical terms, with each carnal atrocity building upon each other until they reach a séance, a kind of Enlightenment clockwork made of frenzied bodies.  Sade’s writing exemplifies what Barthes terms “a contamination of discourses,” with extended speeches championing reason and rationality suddenly broken by curse-laced shouts and blasphemies involving orgies, murder, and torture.  One of many things bedeviling critics is the inability to place Sade within a neat framework of periodicity.  Sade is simultaneously a Gothic writer, embracing the darker strains of Romanticism, an Enlightenment philosopher, and a literary satirist.  Furthermore, his work continually champions crime over law and power over morality.  Those who are more powerful are thus because of Nature.

The theme of subservience is picked up in his analysis of Loyola, whose Spiritual Exercises bears resemblances to Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom.  Each work appears like a glorified outline.  While both writers come from completely different backgrounds, Barthes brings our attention to the meticulousness and concentration involved in writing these books.  Loyola even has a section where the success or failure of the spiritual retreat’s practitioner can be measured on a graph.  Loyola and Sade also have their practitioners in severe isolation and endure physical hardships.

Fourier, the utopian socialist, uses language that combines aspects of both Sade and Loyola.  His utopia is spiritual in nature, but man’s perfection is attained by the release of bodily passions that have been repressed by civilization.  Barthes also explores the playfulness of Fourier’s brand of utopia, especially regarding his notorious phrase about turning the sea into lemonade.  The treatment of Fourier as a literary figure to be celebrated shows how Barthes has evolved from an orthodox Marxist to a non-ideological literary critic.  Marxists shy away from Fourier because of his wild eccentricities and the non-scientific basis for his utopian vision.  Barthes embraces him as he does Sade and Loyola.

The Pleasure of the Text (1975)

Barthes approaches reviewing and criticism as joyful acts, hence the title of the small book, the Pleasure of the Text.  Inspired by Severo Sarduy’s Cobra, a novel about a Cuban drag queen who transforms into a Tibetal bardo during an orgy with leatherclad biker studs, Barthes wrote down mini-essays in alphabetic order.  The essays focused on how a text can bring pleasure to the reader.  He elucidates the much-misunderstood concept of the Death of the Author.  The concept, maligned by the likes of Harold Bloom and Camille Paglia, does not involve turning a literary work into an amalgamation of social forces, thus negating the author.  The explanation is much more prosaic.

The Death of the Author is thus: After the Author has finished his or her work; he has no control over it.  The Author’s interpretative power is negated.  This is because the Reader is not consuming the Author’s Interpretation, but simply a Text.  (Barthes’s book can be seen as a precursor to the current discipline of Reader Reception Theory.)

The book also focuses on the concept of pleasure as it relates to the practice of reading.  He asserts that literature does not require a moral component to be pleasurable to the reader.  As an American subject to High School English classes, there was the tendency to examine works with a Major Moral Lesson, whether it was Grapes of Wrath or Heart of Darkness.  Literary consumption became analogous to an annual teeth cleaning: painful, tedious, and instructive.  But knowing the Moral Lesson made one feel good, or at least pass the quiz.  What became a rarity was how to enjoy the texts as objects of pleasure.  (Unfortunately, Americans have a schizophrenic relationship with pleasure and morality.)

When reading a text, this usually is administered to the skull.

Readers should be able to enjoy the language of the narrative without having to endure horse pills of morality.  An appreciation can be made on how the author formulates the language in the same way art can be appreciated once one becomes aware of specific brushstrokes and manipulation of pigments.  Appreciating books just on their moral level is stunningly pedestrian.

Roland Barthes was revolutionary both in what he reviewed and how he reviewed.  He began as an orthodox Marxist but evolved a personal philosophy that embraced many things.  Ecumenical and joyful, his approach to the review showed a writer both erudite and expansive.

FURTHER READING

Susan Sontag raised awareness of Barthes’s value to a well-rounded intellect.  The closing line of her seminal essay, “Against Interpretation” (1964) reads, “In place of a hermeneutrics we need an erotics of art.”  Barthes provides this much-needed erotics of art.

Sontag wrote two major essays on Barthes:

  • “Remembering Barthes” (1980) in Under the Sign of Saturn (1980).
  • “Writing Itself: On Roland Barthes” (1982) in Where the Stress Falls (2001).

WORKS BY ROLAND BARTHES

At present, many of Barthes’s lesser-known works remain hard to come by.  Except for Mythologies, his critical work remains unknown to lay audiences.  This is unfortunate, especially since the Internet has provided the perfect medium for discussions about pop culture.  The publisher Hill & Wang have volumes of Barthes more notable volumes in print.  So long as one isn’t averse to scouring used bookstores and Internet shopping sources, one can also find his lesser known works in English translation.  Despite his untimely death, Barthes remained prolific.

His instrumental work in the interpretation of pop cultural artifacts and Susan Sontag’s relentless championing should be reason enough to bring his works back into print.

Translation Tuesdays: Wonder (1962), by Hugo Claus

A new series dedicated to literature in translation whether classic or contemporary.

Originally published as De verwondering
Translated from the Dutch by Michael Henry Heim
Archipelago Books (2009)

Wonder is a strange book.  By turns sarcastic, hallucinatory, satirical, and dreamlike, it relates the misadventures of one Victor-Denijs de Rijckel, a teacher of English and German at a secondary school.  He is a teacher so anonymous he lacks any nickname usually given by students.  The novel follows Victor in his picaresque journey, an obsessive quest to find a woman.  Along the way, he acquires a Sancho Panza in the form of a bratty student named Verzele.  His journey ends when he and the student find themselves in a small town named Almout.  It hosts a meeting of former Nazi collaborators.  At the meeting, we learn about their devotion to Crabbe, a messiah figure they believe will return to Belgium.

The novel switches between third person accounts and a first person narrative (Victor’s) during his incarceration in an insane asylum.  The Castilian proverb used by Claus reveals the Wonder’s strange and cruel nature.  (Unfortunately, the proverb remains untranslated in the Archipelago Books edition.  The publisher did manage to get Goya’s illustration of the proverb, Los Caprichos no. 42, with donkeys riding their masters.)  The translated proverb reads, “You who cannot, carry me on your back.”  Further commentary by R. Stanley Johnson states the men’s eyes are closed representing ignorance along with a cruel donkey that controls a man with spurs.  Goya used this topsy-turvy image as “one of the strongest condemnations of contemporary Spanish society.”  The novel condemns contemporary Dutch society, the corrupting nature of Nazi collaboration, and the banal puritanical mysticism of fascism.

Submission and subservience play out among the various characters and the geopolitical background.  The reader absorbs the still-fresh wounds inflicted (and self-inflicted by the Second World War.)  An accretion occurs from the various strata of submission, tragic and cancerous, until it overwhelms every character.  Victor submits to the charms of a mystery woman he follows with obsessive passion.  He also follows Verzele, the roles of imperious schoolteacher and obedient pupil reversed.  The individual’s capitulation to the totalitarian State meets with ironic reversal in Belgium.  While resisting the lure of domestic fascist groups, Belgium came under occupation from German forces on their way to conquer France.  But Belgium was hardly a naïve innocent.  Even though fascism did not thrive there, the nation let a conservative Catholic authoritarianism thrive and flourish.  Belgium’s Catholicism provided the rich potting soil for the les fleurs du mal to bloom, aided by one Leon Degrelle.

While this may strike one as cheap anti-Catholic bigotry, one has only to look at Spain, Italy (fascism’s birthplace), Austria (Hitler’s birthplace), and the Vatican.  The Holy See may have saved a few thousand Jews during World War 2, but could have been more effective if they had bothered to excommunicate Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and other dictators who used Catholicism to further their tyrannical aims and countless atrocities.  (The Vatican would finally abolish the accusation of deicide in 1965, three years after the publication of Wonder, albeit a few decades late of the death camps.)

Leon Degrelle founded the conservative authoritarian Catholic Christus Rex movement and later fought on the Eastern Front as a member of the Waffen-SS.  Claus presents Crabbe as a thinly veiled version of Degrelle.  After the War, Degrelle fled to Spain.  Later on, he became active in various neo-Nazi movements.  The group devoted to Crabbe only looks more pathetic with the light of historical developments shining a light on the mendacious piety of these walleyed fanatics.

Claus weaves together a rich tapestry, presenting an array of memorable characters: the hackneyed anti-Semitic Buick salesman Teddy Maertens, the vicious schoolboy Verzele, the eccentric fascist sculptor Sprange, and many others.  They are planets revolving around Victor, a human void impersonating a scholar whose specialty is the life of Crabbe.

Unlike a realist or neo-realist piece, the novel reads like a New Wave film, a bastard-hybrid of L’Avventura (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1960) and Week End (Jean-Luc Godard, 1967).  This is a quest narrative as black comedy, populated with cowards, traitors, and fanatics.  Peopled by characters willing, by various degrees, to exchange their individuality for collective security and willfully ignorant of the crimes occurring right under their noses.

Wonder offers up brutally damning portraits and wildly farcical set pieces as evidence of his nation’s culpability in World War 2.  Claus’s indictment arises less from a lawyer’s accumulation of evidence but through a visionary dream-logic.  He presents the reader with both the allure and the horror of fascist collaboration.

CCLAP Fridays: On Being Human: Warhammer 40K Space Marines

I continue my CCLaP essay series “On Being Human”, this week exploring the dark world of Warhammer 40K and the Space Marines.

Mondays with the Supremes, Part II: Matters of Protocol

A limited-run series where I review three books about the Supreme Court of the United States, exploring its historical and ideological conflicts, and the transformations it wrought upon law and society.

Alan Dershowitz: I’m not a hired gun. I’ve got to feel there’s some moral or constitutional issue at stake.
Claus von Bülow: But I’m absolutely innocent, and my civil liberties have been egregiously violated!

Reversal of Fortune (Barbet Schroeder, 1990)

With every opinion handed down, the Supreme Court not only decides important constitutional matters, but their opinions could damage the prestige and mythology so ferociously treasured.  Recent decades have seen the Court adopt a relationship to the other branches of government that remains isolated and insular.  Unlike the media feeding frenzy associated with the President and the Congress, the Supreme Court still forbids TV cameras during oral arguments.  The media ban gives the Court a difference from the other branches, at once aloof and antiquated.

The Court desires to keep their distance from the other branches and to avoid breaches in propriety.  At least that’s what the dominant institutional mythology would have one believe.  Despite the nine justices lacking party affiliation on their nameplates, it is a highly political position.  Many Supreme Court justices came from other branches of government or ascended the judicial hierarchy from lower courts.  Once on the Supreme Court the justices don’t need to worry about re-election, but that only reinforces the new nominee’s potential danger and importance.

The Court didn’t always have this insular relationship.  The day after his nomination to the Supreme Court, Robert Jackson joined FDR’s regular poker games.  In these decades, the relationship between the Court and the Presidency became collegial.  (Except for the explosive conflict of FDR’s “court-packing plan” that turned into a fiasco, the Court and FDR remained on amicable terms.)  Even as late as the Sixties, Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas regularly advised President Lyndon Johnson.  Forced off the bench because of an investigation into the improper use of his influence, Abe Fortas’s seat left an opening for Nixon to appoint a conservative justice.

During the Forties, Tommy Corcoran, the famous New Dealer and lobbyist, got thrown out of the Supreme Court building for alleged indiscretions.  These involved his lobbying on behalf of his clients to justices like Black and Douglas.  While Douglas and Corcoran had a close friendship, Douglas would not stand for the lobbying.  If actions like Corcoran’s were leaked to the press, Douglas and others might have to recuse themselves from the case.  And if there weren’t enough justices to hear the case, the case would be either dismissed or sent back to the lower courts.

Prior to the Woodward’s and Armstrong’s Brethren, the Supreme Court preserved the façade of the apolitical.  Only two major breaches of Court etiquette occurred prior to the 1979 bestseller.  On the first occasion was in 1937, Hugo Black made a radio address denying he was a bigot but affirming his membership and resignation from the Ku Klux Klan.

The second occasion was in 1946 by Robert Jackson, in a heated pique when he was passed over for the Chief Justice post and his spat with Justice Hugo Black.  Justice Jackson sent public cables to the Congressional Judiciary Committees exposing Justice Black’s potential conflict of interest in a mining case.  Newspapers published the cables that exposed the politicking, bargaining, and ideological grudge matches that took place behind the velvet curtain.  While the Supreme Court is a rare government institution that cultivates intellect and interpretation, there are still countless opportunities for alliance-building and ideological clashes.  The Court may be removed from the cash-hemorrhaging insults to intelligence one endures during regularly scheduled political campaigns, but that doesn’t mean the Court isn’t an ideological battleground every bit as important as a Presidential debate or town hall meeting.

Not the sharpest knife in the drawer.

What drove Justice Potter Stewart to Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong was Chief Justice Warren Burger’s inept and devious manipulations of Court protocol.  After the Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari (“granting cert” is the shorthand), the Court then hears oral argument.  Following oral argument, then Court then votes and then writes opinions.  Granting cert means the case has constitutional merit and the potential to overturn precedent.  Once oral argument is heard, the Justices vote and then speak, with the senior Justice in the majority going first.  Cases can have multiple votes and the real action occurs with Justices forming alliances and majority-building, every bit as important and political as that of the legislature.  But the Court acts like a Microscopic Legislature, with each side battling to get the necessary five votes.

Pimpin’ ain’t easy.

(Congress faces a more challenging prospect with 100 Senators, 535 Representatives, numerous interest groups, lobbyists, and other personalities working and undermining each other to craft a legislature best tailored to their own self-interests.  While Congress votes to best please its represented constituency, the Court works for the entire nation.)

Court protocol has the Justice in the majority, not the Chief Justice; assign the opinion to another Justice to write.  Chief Justice Burger’s manipulations attempted to put him in the majority and to write the opinion himself.  Part of this was based on Burger’s desire to create his personal judicial legacy.  Among the clerks of the Court, Burger’s dingbat Machiavellianism had them asking, “Is Burger evil or just stupid?”  In one particular case, Burger voted in the affirmative and in the negative multiple times, simply to get into the majority.  Burger seemed less about “sticking to one’s guns”, ideologically speaking, than acting like an attention hog.  The Brethren excels when it depicts these heated arguments in conference.

During the campaigns of 1940 and 1944, William O. Douglas made no secret of “campaigning from the bench,” writing opinions that would please his liberal-libertarian constituency and also appeal to FDR in the hopes of securing the VP spot.  It wasn’t until the ascent of the Missouri haberdasher and his machine-style political campaigning, that Douglas put his presidential ambitions to rest.

Once the older justices began resigning and he could appoint his New Dealer allies to the bench, FDR possessed the rare privilege of nominating nearly the entire Court.  In most cases, the nomination and appointment went smoothly, unlike the televised ideological litmus tests of today.  But FDR did not always have an effortless time getting his legislation passed.  In the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack and pro-war/anti-Asian hysteria, one case came to the attention of the Court.  The story of that case reveals how the Court refused to muscle under Presidential pressure and reassert its autonomy from the Executive Branch.

Will the Supreme Court support the President or will it show backbone?

Up next: Korematsu, Brown, and Padilla